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Abstract 
 
Alternative mechanisms for EU ETS (European Union Emissions Trading Scheme) quotas 
allocations within the Romanian economy are evaluated using a general equilibrium model 
within a dynamic intertemporal framework. Several distribution rules are simulated based on: 
the historical emissions, the least-cost approach and the auctioning scheme with and without a 
preliminary selection of eligible sectors. (1) The resulting marginal abatement cost in ETS 
eligible sectors is only 5.75 EUR/t CO2 for reducing pollution by 20.7%. Such a low level is 
explained by low energy prices and by substitution possibilities with low carbon content 
resources (nuclear and hydroelectricity). (2) Including all sectors in the trade creates a more 
flexible market than in the ETS, since more reduction options are available. (3) The ETS has 
high feasibility for monitoring. All eligible sectors (except refineries and metallurgy) present 
the lowest abatement cost in the economy. (4) Auctioning introduces a strong carbon price-
signal, which reduces emission intensity but creates distortions in terms of trade and worsens 
the country’s energy dependency. (5) Environmental policy has modest macroeconomic 
results and tends to correct the resources allocation. (6) The strong double dividend obtained 
under certain circumstances indicates Romania’s potential for improving its energy efficiency 
and carbon intensity.  
 
 
Keywords: climate policies, EU ETS, National Allocation Plan, quotas allocation, Romania, 
dynamic GCE modeling.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The European Union (EU) introduced into the Community climate strategy one major 
component, the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), designed to achieve CO2 reduction from 
main energy-intensive installations (EC, 2003a). The ETS represents the most important 
carbon market in operation. The countries’ individual objective is set in the National 
Allocation Plan (NAP) that states the total quantity of CO2 quotas and the allocation rules to 
participating sectors. The elaboration of a NAP is a controversial task entailing much debate 
around heterogeneous assignment factors across Member States. The diversity of NAPs arises 
from the considerable freedom delegated to Member States for the magnitude of allowances 
and the rules of quotas distribution (Kolshus and Torvanger, 2005). The first step in the 
elaboration of a NAP is to undertake a top-down economy-wide analysis of the share of 
allowances that should be granted to sectors covered by the ETS. Scientific assessments of 
reduction potential can provide useful insights into the least cost approach to adopt in a 
carbon constrained economy.  
 
Three questions are addressed for the Romanian context: to find the optimal distribution rule, 
to identify the sectors where emission cuts can be achieved and to understand  what the costs 
are likely to be. The efficiency of different quotas distribution schemes is set by means of a 
numerical top-down study applied to Romania by using a general equilibrium framework. The 
necessity of this exercise comes from the statement that in the first trading period “most NAPs 
only made at best a half-hearted effort at incorporating the reduction potential into the sectoral 
differentiation in the NAP or the setting of the total cap” (CAN-E, 2006, p.35).  
 
The quotas allocation rules addressed in this paper refer to the Romanian National Allocation 
Plan built within the EU-ETS that sets the emission cap at 75.9 Mt CO2 (20.7% less than 
Romanian forecasts of emission needs; EC, 2007); the eligible sectors are electricity, 
refineries, metallurgy, glass, cement and paper. The EU Commission suggests three modes of 
allocating targets, based on historical emissions, on forecast emissions and on a least-cost 
approach (EC, 2003b). The method used for setting the national cap is a combination of the 
first two modes: the historical reference period is 2001-2004, while the base year for CO2 
emissions projections is the year 2003. Romania has chosen to distribute freely all allowances, 
except for the new entrant reserves allowances, which remain unused at the end of the period 
(RME, 2006).  
 
Romania ratified the UNFCCC (1994) and the Kyoto Protocol (2001) with a commitment to 
reduce GHG emissions by 8% compared with 1989 levels. Historically, total emissions 
decreased in Romania by about 50% in 2002, mainly due to the strong decline in industrial 
production and the restructuring of the economy in transition to a market economy. The 
commissioning of the first reactor at the nuclear power plant in 1996 also had a significant 
impact on GHG reductions. Given the amount of hot air, it is very unlikely that the reference 
emissions will surpass the level of the Kyoto Protocol target before the end of 2012, even in a 
high economic growth scenario (RME, 2005a). However, by 2020 economic growth could 
increase GHG emissions by 40% above the 2002 level (RME, 2005b). Thus, better insight 
into the development of emissions will allow Romania to manage its emissions over the long 
term. Further actions need to be taken at the national level, aiming at particular investment 
measures in CO2-intensive sectors such as energy and transport.  
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Romania has a low per capita emission level due to a relatively low economic development 
level but high emissions per unit of energy or GDP (carbon intensity). Consequently, the 
abatement of CO2 emissions could have an important positive effect, but it strongly depends 
on the capacity and the flexibility of the economy to absorb the adjustment costs. These costs 
are usually disproportionately high in relation to the economic situation, which despite a high 
growth rate (6.7% in 2006) presents a low GDP per capita level (one third of the EU average). 
 
This paper describes the mechanism for the designing of NAP in the context of Romania, for 
2008-2012. Particularities concern the distribution rule through grandfathering, the eligible 
sectors, and the cap set to the reference period. The third phase of the ETS may seeseveral 
changes such as the redefinition of combustion installations, much stricter targets, the 
extension to new industries, like aluminium and ammonia producers, and to new gases, such 
as nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons. The European Commission intends to increase the 
auctioning the rule, about 60% of allowances in 2013 and 100% in 2020, but adjustments are 
expected with a future international agreement, to be agreed in Copenhagen in 2009 (EC, 
2008).  
 
Our research covers the second phase of the ETS for understanding the NAP mechanism and 
provides lessons for future development of environmental policies within the ETS. To 
simulate scenarios on different allocation rules, we build an intertemporal dynamic general 
equilibrium model (section 2). Simulations are based on the historical emissions, the least-
cost approach and the auctioning scheme, with and without a preliminary selection of eligible 
sectors. The analysis focuses on the marginal abatement cost and on the micro and macro-
economic effects induced during transition and in the final state (section 3). The final section 
concludes and formulates some policy recommendations (section 4). 
 
 
2. Theoretical specifications of the model 
 
The model is built within a neoclassical framework mainly inspired from models applied to 
energy issues (Nordhaus, 1992; Lee et al., 1994; Beaumais, 1995; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 
1995; Burniaux and Troung, 2002, etc). The model assumes a small open economy, which 
faces exogenous world-market prices. Each sector uses labour, capital and inputs provided by 
production sectors; all factors are assumed to be fully mobile across sectors. All prices in the 
model are in relative terms, while capital price is chosen as the numeraire in the model. 
 
The economy is disaggregated into 14 production sectors: four energy sectors (electricity, 
coal, oil and gas), four energy intensive sectors eligible for the ETS (metallurgy, glass, 
cement, paper) and six sectors not covered (chemistry, transport, agriculture, construction, 
services and ‘other activities’).  
 
A constant returns-to-scale neo-classical production function describes the domestic 
production. The separation of different types of energy and non-energy inputs is in line with 
the general KLEM1 approach, as most commonly adopted in the energy literature. The nested 
structure follows the same principle in all productive sectors (j) as presented in the Figure 1, 
yet with varying elasticities and technical parameters. 
 
The source of carbon dioxide emissions is the use of primary inputs coming from all energy 
sectors.2 It is assumed that emissions are proportional to the amount of primary energy used in 
each sector and that both domestic and imported energy inputs have the same emission 
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coefficients. This avoids substitution with imported inputs for the sole reason of evading the 
carbon-constraining policy. The environmental regulation also concerns fossil-fuel imports, 
since their combustion takes place domestically. 
 
Figure 1. The nested production function  
 
 
The formalisation of the permit market assumes a perfect competition framework, which 
could well be the case in the context of thousands of installations participating in the trade. 
The permit market simulates here only real emission reductions and takes into account neither 
the existing nor prospective JI projects nor the amount of hot air that participation in the 
Kyoto Protocol permit market would generate. The surplus of almost 125 Mt CO2 would 
make Romania a net permit seller on this market. Losses of CO2 emissions are due to the 
transitional recession and the consequent general economic contraction on the supply-side. 
They do not stream from real environmental improvements and the fact that most reductions 
have never occurred could undermine the permit market structure and create instability if their 
volumes are significant (Pesic, 2003; Klepper and Peterson, 2004).  
 
The carbon market operates a zero-sum game, meaning that the more CO2 a sector emits, the 
greater the efforts required of other sectors to decrease their emissions:  
∑∑ =−
j i
jiji COCO 0)22( ,, , where jiCO ,2 represents the number of permit granted to the 
sector j that employs a production technology using the energy input i.  
 
If perP  is the price of the emission permit, the product ∑
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context of perfect competition on the permit market, the optimal principle to set the least cost 
abatement approach consists in the integration of the net permit balance into the price frontier, 
at the lowest level of the technological process. This technique is economically efficient 
because it avoids the transfer of the carbon price on the consumer, and sends the signal 
downstream into the production technology, encouraging substitutions between inputs. 
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Estimation of the abatement cost is set on the basis of optimal economic criteria for creating 
the right incentives that eliminate speculative actions on the market. In the same way, the 
benchmark statement of NAPs should be set on the basis of best available technique standards 
for individual processes and should not use the average performance of existing plants (CAN-
E, 2006). 
 
The consumer is representative for all households. He receives a fixed share of dividends 
from productive sectors, wages paid by the producer and the rest of the world as well as 
transfers from the State and firms. Household makes the trade-off between leisure and 
consumption by maximizing the intra-temporal utility, ( , )t tu C l , following the principle of a 
CES function. The utility does not include the pollution stock for examining the welfare 
variation net of environmental gains. The welfare indicator (EV) is expressed by the hicksian 
measure of the equivalent income variation: 
),,,(),,,( 10001111 UrwPceUrwPceEV −= , where Pc denotes the consumer price, w the 
nominal wage, r the interest rate and U the inter-temporal utility described below. 
 
The State is not an optimizer agent and its activity is assessed against the expenditure and 
revenue accounts of the base year. As for the balance of the rest of the world, the external 
debt is exogenous and the equilibrating variable is the exchange rate.  
 
The dynamics is based on the active population’s exogenous growth and capital 
accumulation, following Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). The dynamics 
of active population is limited by the demographical decline recorded in Romania after 1990, 
but active population’s growth is however assumed (0.1% by year), because the current 
unemployment rate is officially set at around 8% and unofficially at 40%. The latter is mostly 
due to agriculturally-disguised unemployment that occurred during economic restructurating 
in the 1990s which diminished industrial labour in favour of the agricultural sector 
(Stanculescu and Bereveoscu, 2004).  
 
The model assumes an infinitely living representative household that maximizes utility 
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint defined by per capita variables, reflated with 
the active population growth rate, n: 
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where θ  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ρ  the rate of time preference, TRSr et 
TRSp are respectively households’ received and paid transfers. The modified golden rule is 
determined by the Euler equation: 
)1)(1(1 nr ++=+ ρ  
At the producer level, the capital accumulation equation (function of per capita variables) 
implies backward looking specifications, given the capital depreciation rate δ : 
[ ] )1/()1(1 nKIK ttt +−+=+ δ . 
The equilibrium is set on the saving-investment balance; Walras law is checked at each 
period, but still has an intertemporal form: current savings decrease with the repayment of a 
fraction θ  of the public debt, dpub , discounted with the interest rate:  
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where walras is a control variable of equilibrium, pinv the investment price, invtot the volume 
of total investment, Shous and Sentr are respectively the saving of households and enterprises, 
and PubDef the public deficit.  
  
Resolution is done by means of the GAMS/MCP software (Brooke et al., 1998). The 
efficiency parameters of the technology as well as the share parameters are obtained through 
calibration. The social accounting matrix is built on data provided by Romanian National 
Accounts (NIS, 2006) related to the year 2003. 
 
 
3. Numerical simulations 
 
We simulate a 20.7% reduction of the emission level attained in 2003 which represents 19.8 
Mt CO2. It is tantamount to implicit assumption that the reference year reproduces the 
projected emissions up to 2008-2012. The constraint is gradually applied to the trade period 
and concerns only ETS sectors.  
Five allocation schemes are simulated. The first scenario is based on the historical approach 
applied to the reference emissions of the year 2003, and the permits are allocated by 
grandfathering (HA). Other distribution rules are tested, such as the least-cost approach 
(LCA), the auctioning (AUC), and the integration of all sectors into the trade (All). 
Alternatively, income from permits-auctioning is recycled in the economy by reducing 
employers’ labour taxes (REC). Simulations are done for thirty periods and the shock is 
applied from 2008, which corresponds to the sixth period in our model, having therefore an 
announced character related to the agents’ perfect anticipation.  
 
 
3.1 The historical approach case (HA) 
 
On the basis of forward-looking specifications, the model allows households to anticipate the 
consequences of the new policy and to adapt their consumption and saving behaviour to the 
new price system. Despite increased volume of consumption (0.12%), the social welfare 
index, measured as the equivalent variation of the consumption income, shows a negative 
variation (-0.78%). This is an income effect (-0.12%), as wages, profits and social transfers 
decrease (-0.11%, -0.13% and -0.44% respectively); we also discount the partial repayment of 
the public debt at each period.  
 
Following the functional forms adopted in the consumer program, three inter- and intra-
temporal decisions are simultaneously taken, based on the trade-off between the consumption 
in the short and long terms, between the leisure and consumption in each period, and between 
intratemporal saving3 and consumption. The trajectory of consumption shows the effects of 
individual choices: for an anticipated decrease of the price index, the representative household 
expands its aggregate demand until the policy becomes effective. After the period when the 
shock is applied, consumption slims down to its convergence value.  
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Graph 1. Household price, saving and consumption trajectories (%, reference = 0) 
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Intertemporal trade-off between present and future consumption tends to favour the long run 
so that there is a switch in respective rates of growth: the saving curve is below the 
consumption’s trajectory at the beginning of the interval, and above its curve after the shock.  
Intratemporal trade-off between leisure and consumption is done in favour of the latter for a 
substitution value set at 1.9; the increase in labour slowly diminishes leisure and encourages 
consumption.  
 
Two main arguments are considered below to explain the negative effect of the policy on 
social welfare and the positive impact on individual consumption. The latter is indeed rather 
counterintuitive as the policy is very restrictive:  
(1) the mechanism implied at the welfare level concerns the consumption income related to 
both the intertemporal utility value and the price system. In this way, its formula takes into 
account the intertemporal aspects that integrate all resources accumulated during the interval 
discounted with the interest rate. The increase in the discount rate depreciates the 
intertemporal income compared with the reference period and leads to a higher decrease in the 
intertemporal welfare value.  
 
(2) the consumption increases throughout the interval. We recall that households are not 
subject to the environmental constraint and thus they are only indirectly affected by the 
restriction set on emissions. Energy goods and services represent a low fraction in the current 
household expenditures (9%) and the new policy involves the decrease of electricity demand 
only, which represents 3.3% of the total expenditures. The environmental policy has thus a 
marginal effect on the residential energy consumption.  
A positive price-effect is added: the price’s decrease for goods provided by ‘other activities’ 
significantly diminishes the total expenditures, as their part in the budget is very important 
(39%).  
 
From the environmental point of view, the decrease in energy demand (-0.4%) points out the 
positive impacts the policy has at household level on the use of these resources. Meanwhile, 
individual substitutions do not favour products with weak carbon content, as only electricity 
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demand decreases. The price-signal sent to households is not strong enough to change their 
consumption behaviour. Thus, policy should be expanded at this level and the residential 
energy consumption constrained.  
 
The macroeconomic effects are relatively low considering the high constraint imposed on 
the system. The low effect on the real GDP (-0.16%) is explained by factor mobility and 
substitution possibilities that are allowed through functional forms in the producer-nested 
technology. Both initial and final allocations are optimal as presented in the producer 
program; still the final situation appears more efficient from the environmental point of view 
while integrating the quantitative constraint on pollution. Structural change hypotheses are 
adopted with regard to the transitional phase Romania comes through, which implies 
reorganisation of the industrial picture, with fast mutations of human and financial resources 
across sectors.  
 
With regard to the current account, changes are in terms of exports (-0.51%), imports (0.11%) 
and exchange rate (-0.63%). The external debt is fixed at the initial level which makes a 
pressure on the terms of trade and depreciates the national currency. The shock has thus a 
negative impact and leads to a loss of competitiveness in most of the sectors. The policy has 
positive effects, however, regarding the energy import structure, as coal and gas decrease by 
respectively 22% and 1.2%. Consequently, Romanian energy dependency falls by 4.2%, 
which is an underestimated result by the initial assumption that sets the international price 
exogenously to one. An increase in this value is expected while the emission constraint is 
applied at the regional or international level.  
 
Graph 2. Evolution of the GDP by components (%, reference = 0)4 
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In contrast with the modest macro results, sector effects show important variations for the 
producer, mainly in the trading sectors: the coal output is significantly reduced (-22%), as 
producers account for the emission coefficients in their optimisation program; consequently, 
the demand increases for electricity facilities (6.5%). The production costs increase in most of 
the sectors, except for glass and cement, as a result of increased labour and energy prices on 
the one hand and permit purchase on the other hand.  
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Sectors that become net sellers of permits are glass, cement and paper production. They 
present thus low-cost abatement opportunities and record gains on the permit market. The 
cement production accounts for only energy related emissions and significantly the process 
emissions are excluded.  
 
Table 1. Sector results from the permit market implementation (%, reference = 0) 
Sector            Output  Labor    Invest. Energy EnergPr Export Import PrCost  CO2    Permits*  Perm€** 
Electricity  
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Metallurgy 
Glass 
Cement 
Paper 
Chemistry 
Transport 
Agriculture 
Construction 
Services 
Other activit. 
6.48 
-22.11 
-0.13 
-1.26 
-0.86 
-0.22 
-0.17 
-0.51 
-0.52 
-0.34 
-0.27 
-0.14 
-0.08 
-0.49 
7.62 
-21.98 
0.23 
-1.52 
1.24 
-0.92 
-1.46 
-0.35 
0.08 
-0.16 
-0.11 
0.05 
0.09 
-0.29 
7.42 
-22.17 
-0.02 
-1.87 
0.84 
-1.06 
-1.56 
-0.60 
-0.08 
-0.38 
-0.27 
-0.19 
-0.15 
-0.48 
6.17 
-22.22 
-0.29 
-1.01 
-2.08 
2.65 
3.24 
-0.40 
-0.96 
-0.73 
-0.71 
-0.92 
-0.71 
-1.33 
0.78 
0.04 
0.20 
-0.46 
1.65 
-2.03 
-2.61 
-0.08 
0.42 
0.14 
0.17 
0.31 
0.22 
0.33 
-1.13 
-0.52 
-0.66 
-0.34 
-0.82 
-0.20 
-0.04 
-0.44 
-0.52 
-0.52 
-0.54 
-0.46 
-0.49 
-0.45 
9.47 
-21.76 
0.71 
-1.15 
-0.01 
-0.01 
-0.13 
0.00 
-0.10 
0.71 
1.08 
1.11 
0.75 
0.42 
0.50 
-0.11 
0.03 
-0.29 
0.19 
-0.44 
-0.59 
-0.19 
-0.11 
-0.12 
-0.09 
-0.18 
-0.15 
-0.19 
-20.69 
-21.76 
-0.37 
-1.60 
-5.67 
-66.48 
-65.77 
-53.06 
-0.64 
-0.46 
0.13 
-0.10 
-0.56 
-1.28 
7.45 
0 
813.2 
0 
1450.1 
-251.8 
-1892.8 
-126.2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
42.8 
0 
4672.4 
0 
8331.6 
-1446.7 
-10875.1 
-725.1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Notes: *Sector permit supply (-) / demand (+) on the market (10³).  
**Sector loss (+) or gains (-) from the permit trade (10³ EUR). 
 
The electricity sector presents the most contrasting effects, as it is the greatest polluter in the 
economy and also the biggest energy supplier. This explains to some degree why an increase 
in the production price responds to an increase in the supply. The demand-effect is due to low 
emission coefficients that characterise the output. The price increase is less surprising, as the 
intermediate consumption in this sector is mainly energetic and increased prices of inputs; to 
this input cost-effect, we add an increase in the demand for emission permits (7450 permits).  
 
Refineries and metallurgy are also net buyers in the permit market. The production 
technology of refineries presents few substitution possibilities between energy products: the 
main input in this sector is the oil that can hardly substitute for other energy inputs. 
Metallurgy records the highest loss, despite a high energy intensity level which could imply 
low abatement cost. In contrast, the intensive energy consumption combined with an energy 
price increase (1.6%) leads to a consequent rise in the production cost (0.2%) and to a 
decrease in sector supply (-0.9%).  
 
The chemistry sector follows the same trend even if it is not constrained by the environmental 
policy: the high variation of energy inputs cost decreases the volume of production.  
Transports are affected too, as the oil is the main input. The gas sector also records a decrease 
in production, in spite of the low carbon content of its output and of the weak price variation: 
the fall in production of energy-intensive activities, such as metallurgy, paper and chemistry, 
explains their reduced demand for gas inputs. Light industries – agriculture, constructions and 
services – benefit from the increase in household demand according to a price-effect which 
implies a lower decrease in their output. Supply decreases in response to higher energy costs.   
 
All sectors, except for agriculture, reduce their CO2 emissions, even if they are not covered by 
the trade and thus not constrained by the policy. This implies that the policy applied only to 
energy and energy-intensive sectors can create a price-signal strong enough to interfere in the 
consumption decisions of the other producers. Meanwhile, the energy intensity of the GDP is 
increasing (2.2%) as a consequence of increased consumption of electricity. We conclude 
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then that environmental constraints do not necessarily imply decrease in the energy demand, 
because permit gains can stimulate production and changes can occur in the energy inputs 
structure.   
 
The permit market represents a volume of 2.27 million of traded allowances that sets the 
equilibrium price to 5.75 euros. The marginal abatement cost plays a key role in models 
dealing with climate change issues. Its value is often seen as a measure of welfare on the 
supply-side. The cost of reducing the emission of one tonne of carbon dioxide is computed in 
this model net of transaction costs. It may appear low considering that the cap is set at 79.3% 
of the reference emission for the trading sectors.  
 
Two main factors explain the modest value of the marginal abatement cost: the low energy 
prices and the high substitution possibilities between energy inputs. There is consensus on the 
fact that economies with low energy prices need a low price-signal in order to achieve their 
target. The same relation is valid in economies that predominantly use coal in sectors with a 
good chance of replacing it with other inputs, especially in the electricity sector (Böhringer 
and Rutherford, 2000). The Romanian economy presents both characteristics, as energy prices 
are still low and coal can further be replaced by hydro and nuclear resources.  
 
We now extend the analysis to other emission limitation objectives applied in the same 
trading sectors. The abatement cost curve shows the value of the permit for several levels of 
alternative targets, which remains relatively low for carbon constraints set below 30%.  
 
Graph 3. Marginal abatment cost curve
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3.2. Results from alternative allocation rules   
 
It is assumed that all sectors participate in the permit trade and that they freely benefit from 
the initial allocation (scenario All). In order to render comparable the results for the two cases 
(HA versus All), the constraint in All scenario is the environmental benefit obtained in 
industrial sectors within the HA case, precisely a target set to 15.2%. For the other scenarios, 
the constraint is set to 20.7% of the ETS sectors’ emissions, providing a different outcome for 
the overall industrial emissions. 
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Simulation results show that the permit price is higher in the HA case (5.75 EUR against 4.8 
EUR in the All case), which corresponds to a lower equilibrium volume of traded quotas (2.27 
M of permits against 3.97 M in the All scenario). As expected, the permit market in the All 
case has greater flexibility; in this way, a market opening to light industries and other energy 
sectors, such as coal and gas, offers the opportunity to integrate less costly options to reduce 
emissions. The HA market might appear from this point of view rather rigid, as it limits trade 
to energy-intensive installations. As transaction costs are not considered in this model, results 
should be understood as underestimated with regard to monitoring costs.  
 
Table 2. Simulations results (%, reference = 0) 
Variable HA All LCA AUC REC 
Real GDP 
Aggregated output 
Permit price (euro/ tCO2) 
ETS sectors’ emissions 
Industrial CO2 emissions 
Total CO2 emissions 
Energy inputs 
Total energy demand 
Energy intensity 
Energy dependency 
Equivalent Variation 
Households consumption 
Consumer Price Index 
Individual Income 
Employment 
Wage 
Public Deficit 
Public Debt 
Public Income 
Employers’ social contributions 
Employees’ social contributions 
VAT, Duties and Excises 
Imports 
Exports 
Exchange rate 
Interest rate 
Invested Saving (total) 
Households Invested Saving 
Enterprises saving 
Invested Public Debt 
Investment 
Investment price 
-0.16 
0.08 
5.75 
-20.70 
-15.20 
-14.45 
1.92 
2.16 
2.21 
-4.22 
-0.78 
0.12 
-0.24 
-0.12 
0.02 
-0.13 
-3.96 
-3.92 
-0.08 
-0.09 
-0.11 
-0.11 
0.11 
-0.51 
-0.63 
0.50 
-0.35 
-0.39 
-0.34 
3.43 
-0.05 
-0.29 
-0.07 
0.10 
4.79 
-17.78 
-15.20 
-14.43 
2.02 
2.24 
2.31 
-4.17 
-0.76 
0.12 
-0.24 
-0.12 
0.02 
-0.12 
-4.18 
-4.14 
-0.08 
-0.09 
-0.11 
-0.11 
0.11 
-0.47 
-0.60 
0.48 
-0.33 
-0.37 
-0.32 
3.67 
-0.05 
-0.28 
-0.14 
0.08 
5.70 
-20.70 
-15.17 
-14.42 
1.85 
2.11 
2.12 
-4.16 
-0.69 
0.11 
-0.23 
-0.12 
0.02 
-0.12 
-4.71 
-4.68 
-0.08 
-0.09 
-0.10 
-0.11 
0.11 
-0.46 
-0.60 
0.44 
-0.30 
-0.33 
-0.28 
4.25 
-0.04 
-0.26 
-0.89 
-1.82 
3.68 
-20.70 
-15.98 
-15.31 
-6.55 
-5.45 
-5.30 
1.29 
-3.59 
0.45 
-0.96 
-0.51 
-0.06 
-0.92 
41.09 
41.29 
0.41 
-0.89 
-0.97 
-0.46 
0.44 
-1.96 
-2.46 
1.93 
-2.58 
-1.45 
-2.72 
-44.08 
-1.47 
-1.12 
0.19 
-0.79 
3.63 
-20.70 
-16.11 
-15.43 
-6.81 
-5.59 
-7.14 
0.23 
0.54 
0.69 
0.11 
0.80 
0.16 
1.06 
-30.22 
-30.23 
0.87 
-4.48 
1.23 
0.80 
0.09 
-0.91 
-0.48 
-0.06 
0.51 
-0.74 
0.60 
30.27 
0.47 
0.04 
 
The scenario built within the least-cost approach (LCA case) assumes that eligible sectors are 
those included in the Historical Approach simulation (HA). The recourse to the LCA supposes 
a more theoretical technique: it is based on the fact that the abatement costs are substantially 
different across sectors, and for measuring these differences, a uniform CO2 tax is simulated 
in all sectors. The resulting emissions are used to determine the sectoral allocation, meaning 
that more allowances are granted to industries with more expensive abatement possibilities 
than to those with lower abatement costs. 
The simulation run under the least cost approach reveals possibilities to reduce emissions in 
the following sectors ranked by decreasing order: cement, electricity, gas, glass, paper, coal, 
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constructions, agriculture, services, ‘other activities’, chemistry, refineries, metallurgy and 
transports. While the historical approach indicates the following rank: cement, glass, paper, 
electricity, oil and metallurgy. It appears that all ETS eligible sectors except refineries and 
metallurgy present the lowest abatement cost in the economy. Giving their higher abatement 
costs, these two sectors benefit of a more generous initial allocation under the LCA case, 
which explains why CO2 emissions decrease less compared with the HA test.  
 
The permit allocation in the HA case  projects the historical emissions, while in the LCA 
scenario more allowances are granted to sectors with costly abatement possibilities (refineries 
and metallurgy) and fewer to those with lower abatement cost (cement, glass, paper and 
electricity). Results from the LCA scenario are close to the HA case, but the resulting permit 
price is slightly lower (5.71 versus 5.75 EUR), reflecting more efficiency in the LCA 
allocation scheme. In spite of a similar total initial allocation (5.63 M permits), demand and 
supply take different equilibrium values: 2.27 M permits in the HA case and only 0.57 M 
permits in the LCA case. The fact that the trading almost disappears is the natural 
consequence of permits distribution according to each sector marginal cost.  
 
Table 3. Sector results on the permit market 
 
The analysis of the permit auction (AUC case) is also of great interest, even if the European 
Directive says that at least 90% of their initial allocation should be granted for free to eligible 
sectors, in order to ensure a period of information and experience in dealing with this 
instrument. We simulate the hypothesis that all permits are auctioned to ETS sectors and 
assume that the auction is done at the same price for all allowances.  
 
The abatement cost value is a function of the permit demand, which is lower in the auction 
case, as the energy intermediate consumption decreases by almost 6.6%. The permit supply is 
higher in this scenario (56.3 M permits), which lowers the equilibrium price (3.68 EUR). The 
energy demand decreases in all sectors for two interdependent reasons: the output decreases in 
all activities as a demand-effect and the energy price rises as a cost-effect. From the 
perspective of the environmental policy, the shock has a positive impact on the final demand 
(-5.5%), on the energy intensity (-5.3%) and on total CO2 emission levels (-15.4%). But the 
national energy dependency is increasing (1.3%): the domestic price increase encourages 
imports for similar goods, despite the national currency depreciation.   
 
 
Sector 
Permits (10³) 
     HA             All           LCA       AUC  
Permits Value (10³ €) 
    HA             All            LCA            AUC        
Electricity  
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Metallurgy 
Glass 
Cement 
Paper 
Chemistry 
Transport 
Agriculture 
Construction 
Services 
Other activities 
7.45 
0 
813.21 
0 
1450.08 
-251.8 
-1892.8 
-126.20 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-1171.9 
-40.8 
572.1 
-482.8 
1038.3 
-252.6 
-1898.5 
-125.9 
436.5 
1250.5 
75.9 
67.3 
230.3 
301.7 
24.4 
0 
164.9 
0 
383.3 
-65.6 
-469.1 
-39.8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
41442.3 
0 
3856.5 
0.00 
8739.6 
232.9 
1784.1 
223.8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
42.81 
0 
4672.4 
0 
8331.6 
-1446.7 
-10875 
-725.1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-5628.8 
-196.0 
2747.6 
-2318.8 
4987.2 
-1213.2 
-9118.5 
-604.5 
2096.4 
6006.1 
364.8 
323.1 
1105.9 
1448.9 
139.1 
0 
940.5 
0 
2188.9 
-373.1 
-2669.3 
-226.1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
152633.8 
0 
14203.7 
0 
32188.4 
857.9 
6571 
824.1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Total 2271 3401 573 56279 13046.8 16332.4 3268.5 207278.9 
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The auctioning policy has a punishing effect in social and economic terms: lower agents’ 
resources imply lower investment and slow good accumulation with negative effect on the 
final growth (-0.89%). The scarcity of capital leads to an increase in the interest rate (1.9%) 
that depreciates the intertemporal consumer income more, which explains the strong negative 
impact on social welfare (-3.6%). At the budget level, the permit incomes increase the State 
revenues, but the decline in the activity lowers tax income and increases both the public debt 
and the budget deficit. These negative effects can be adjusted by complementary policies, 
such as permit revenue recycling.  
 
With this aim in mind, we simulate the case where auction income is recycled to firms by 
reduced taxation on labour, such as employer social contributions (REC case). The policy 
enhances the rise in employment and thus in wage income, and benefits households by 
increased consumption and intertemporal welfare as well. The consumption and investment 
variation explains the GDP growth that is most significant across simulations. The 
comparison with the grandfathering scheme (HA, All and LCA) leads to the conclusion that a 
more restrictive policy implies deeper structural transformations that can be favourable to 
factor allocation when complementary measures are effective.  
 
Transversal analysis of our simulations indicates relative weak values of the permit price for 
high environmental objectives (less than 5.8 EUR). This modest value is explained by the 
initial high energy intensity in Romania, by low energy prices and substitution possibilities 
between energy inputs. The formalisation of the permit market contributes to this result too, 
since it integrates optimal economic criteria derived from perfect competition conditions that 
avoid both speculative actions and the increase in consumer price with the allowance cost. 
 
All simulations show that the macroeconomic costs are not significant in terms of absolute 
variation (below 0.9% of GDP). The shock absorption at macro level can partly be explained 
by the initial structural conditions set on the perfect mobility of factors and substitution 
possibilities. These conditions are related to the database of the reference year 2003 that 
implies a transition period with deep structural changes in terms of economic system and 
institutional transformations. Simulations done with the GREEN model (Pesic, 2003) applied 
to Eastern European countries show that even if rigidities are considered, aggregate cost 
estimates remain modest (0.3% of GDP). 
 
Regarding the quota allocation rule, the least cost approach reveals the lowest abatement cost 
under the grandfathering distribution principle, while auctioning creates the harmful carbon 
price-signal, since it most affects welfare, economic growth, employment and energy 
dependency. However, effects can be improved if allowances income is recycled within the 
economy, by reduced payroll taxes. Among all policies, this option is the only one that creates 
conditions for obtaining the so-called double dividend effect, by reducing carbon emissions 
and improving individual welfare or economic growth.  
 
Sectors are differently impacted, depending on their energy intermediate consumption and 
their output carbon content, and also on the number of allowances and their distribution 
regime. Consequently, the electricity sector records an increase in its output considering the 
low emission coefficients, while the glass, cement and paper producers act as net seller in the 
permit market in all scenarios except for the auctioning case. Refineries, metallurgy, 
chemistry and transport are the most affected sectors, because of their energy intensive 
intermediate consumption, while the coal production strongly diminishes with the demand for 
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its products. Light industries are less affected in terms of output but still record an increase in 
their energy input prices; their emissions are consequently reduced. 
 
 
4.  Conclusions and policy recommendations  
 
The definition of the permit distribution scheme is typically a very delicate issue with regard 
to the constraining level and the selection of participant activities, as it affects the efficiency 
of trade, social welfare, the non-eligible sectors and economic growth. Making effective 
allocation rules implies to balance the theoretical outcome with political considerations on 
what is practically feasible. Four main conclusions can be derived from our numerical results. 
 
• Concerning the abatement cost, lessons derived from simulations indicate that any 
carbon market price set above our estimated value provide benefits to the Romanian 
economy through national cheap mitigation possibilities. Participation to the EU-ETS 
could further reduce this cost, since other flexible mechanisms will be in place, such 
as the joint implementation projects. However, these area limited to 10% of the total 
allocated volume (RME, 2006). The decision to contract JI projects should take into 
account the low estimated cost of abatement due to national efforts while trading off 
between selling quotas on the market or through JIP.  
 
• The selection of the European Directive concerning the eligible sectors (HA) is 
justified in the Romanian case, because the trade participants (except for refineries and 
metallurgy) present the lowest abatement costs in the economy. Among grandfathering 
scenarios, the recommended policy relates to the least cost abatement case (LCA) since 
quotas distribution is done according to each sector abatement cost.  
 
• Two main lessons were found for the third phase of the EU ETS, with regard to 
market enlargement to other sectors and to quotas auctioning. Firstly, the integration 
of all sectors into ETS renders the permit market more flexible, even if the policy 
could be more expensive than our estimations, as monitoring costs were not included 
in our calculations. On the other hand, long term benefits could offset the short-term 
administrative costs (EC, 2008).  Secondly, auctioning has a harmful effect on sectors 
and households, while compensation of producers by tax deduction indicates positive 
benefits and the highest outcome among all policies here discussed, from both 
economic and environmental perspectives. The recommended policy is thus the quotas 
auctioning with complementary measures, such as income recycling through reduced 
payroll taxes.  
 
• The question of compatibility of economic growth and environmental concern is a 
major issue for the enforcement of constraining policy. General findings from our 
simulations, which could be extended to similar transition countries, show that 
economic and environmental objectives are not incompatible. The strong double 
dividend, in the form of improved environmental quality together with negative social 
costs, indicates the great economic potential for increasing the energy efficiency. 
Other allocation rules of the scarcity rent revenue, as reduced taxes on value added or 
on capital, would need for more economic research.  
 
Theoretical outcomes have to be considered as a starting point rather than an outcome, and 
should be better integrated into the political decision while designing the National Allocation 
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Plan, independently of industry pressures that could be exerted. The evaluation of economic 
implications for sectors and firms should be set on main arguments of the climate change 
objectives, such as the right carbon signal sent to polluters and the incentive to innovate. Even 
if Romania’s commitment to the Kyoto Protocol is already established, mitigating rapidly-
growing fossil needs beyond 2012 will be a challenging task for the sustainable development 
and implementation of environmental regulations. The potential of Romania to reduce carbon 
intensity with low-cost measures must be quantified and exploited consequently, so its 
economic and social development may enjoy sustainable benefits.   
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Notes 
1 Capital-labor-energy-materials. 
2
 The electricity sector aggregates both electricity production and distribution, and also the 
gas distribution network. Thus a quantity of CO2 emissions is associated with the use of the 
output of this sector. 
3
 Saving is set at a fixed proportion of the income, so saving and income trajectories are 
superposed. 
4
 Variations of net exports are insignificant, thus not represented on this graph. 
 
 
References 
 
Beaumais, O., 1995, ‘Une réinterprétation des politiques de l’environnement par les modèles’, 
Université de Paris I Panthéon – Sorbonne, PhD thesis. 
Böhringer, C., Rutherford, T.F., 2000, Decomposing the Cost of Kyoto: A Global CGE 
Analysis of Multilateral Policy Impact, Document de travail ZEW/00-11, Centre for 
European Economic Research, (ZEW), Mannheim.  
Brooke, A., Kendrick, D., Meeraus, A. and  Raman, R., 1998, GAMS :  a  user’s guide, 
GAMS Development Corporation, Washington.  
Burniaux, J.M., Troung, T. P., 2002, ‘GTAP-E: An energy-environmental version of the 
GTAP model’, GTAP Technical Paper No. 16. 
Cass, D., 1965, ‘Optimum growth in an aggregative model of capital accumulation’, Review 
of Economic Studies, 32, 233-240.  
CAN-E, Climate Action Network Europe, 2006, National Allocation Plans 2005-7: Do they 
deliver? Key lessons to Member States for 2008-12, available via 
http://www.climnet.org/EUenergy/NAPs.htm. 
European Commission, 2003a, Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61EC.  
European Commission, 2003b, ‘The EU Emissions Trading Scheme: How to develop a 
National Allocation Plan. Non-Paper 2nd meeting of Working Group 3’, Monitoring 
Mechanism Committee, Directorate General Environment, 1st April, 2003.  
 16 
European Commission, 2007, ‘Emissions trading: Commission approves Romania’s national 
allocation plans for 2007 and 2008-2012’, IP/07/1612, Brussels. 
European Commission, 2008, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse 
gas emissions allowance trading system of the Community’, COM(2008) 16 final 
2008/0013 (COD), Brussels. 
Klepper, G., Peterson S., 2004, ‘The EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Allowance Prices, Trade 
Flows, Competitiveness Effects’, European Environment 14.  
Kolshus, H.H., Torvanger A., 2005. ‘Analysis of EU member states’ national allocation 
plans’, Working Paper, CICERO. 
Koopmans, T.C., 1965, ‘On the concept of optimal economic growth’, in The Econometric 
Approach to Development Planning, Amsterdam.  
Lee, H., Oliveira-Martins, J., van der Mensbrugghe, D. (1994). ‘The OECD GREEN model: 
an updated overview’, Working Paper No. 97, OECD Development Centre. 
McKibbin, W.J., Wilcoxen, P.J., 1995, ‘The Theoretical and Empirical Structure of the G-
Cubed Model’, Discussion Papers 118, Brookings Institution International Economics.  
NIS, National Institute of Statistics, 2006, Conturi Nationale 2002-2003, Bucarest.  
Nordhaus, W.D., 1992, ‘An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases’, Science 
258, 1315-1319.  
Pesic, R., 2003, ‘Flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol in Central and Eastern 
Europe’, International Fellowship Project, available via http://www.policy.hu/pesic/.  
Ramsey, Y.F., 1928, ‘A Mathematical Theory of Saving’, Economic Journal 38, 543-559.  
RME, Romanian Ministry of Environment and Water Management, 2005a, ‘National Strategy 
on Climate Change of Romania 2005-2007’, Bucharest.  
RME, Romanian Ministry of Environment and Water Management, 2005b, ‘Romania’s third 
national communication on climate change under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change’, Bucharest.  
RME, Romanian Ministry of Environment and Water Management, 2006, ‘Romanian 
National Allocation Plan for the periods 2007 and 2008-2012’, Bucarest.  
Stanculescu, S.M., Berevoescu, I., 2004, ‘Households, work and flexibility. Critical review of 
literature’, Edited by Claire Wallace, Report 2000-2003. 
 
